

Unipolarity, Globalization and Choice: Dynamics of Great Power Politics in the 21st Century

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| 요약 |

제가 의뢰받은 주제 그리고 제가 말씀드릴 주제는 21세기의 국제질서와 강대국의 역학관계가 되겠습니다. 냉전이 종식되고 나서 많은 변화가 일어났습니다. 사실 7년밖에 지나지 않았지만 21세기에 들어오면서 우리 주위에 많은 놀라운 일들이 벌어지고 있습니다. 어떤 국가들은 여러 가지 변화를 겪고 또 예상치 못한 방향으로 나가고 있는 것 같습니다. 헤게모니 경쟁, 새로운 냉전의 대결과 비슷한 양상을 보여주고 있는 것 같습니다. 허니문을 연장시키는 것이 아니라 미국은 좀 더 깊은 관계를 일본과 같이 하고 싶어 하고, 공유된 가치에 대해서 전략적인 파트너십을 더욱 더 공고화하고 있습니다. 미국과 EU도 마찬가지로 여러 이슈에 대해서 연합전선을 구축을 하고 있습니다. 21세기에 있어서 강대국의 관계는 많은 놀라움을 주고 있습니다.

21세기에 들어서면서 중국과 미국의 관계가 상당히 긍정적이고 안정되게 발전되고 있습니다. 21세기 초에 들어와서는 사실 조금 어떤 대결양상이 있었었습니다. 부시 대통령이 취임하고 나서부터 중국에 대해서 상당히 강경한 입장을 취하겠다고 공약을 했었습니다. 중국과 미국은 전략적인 경쟁자라는 언급까지 했었습니다. 거의 중국지도자를 의도적으로 무시를 했었고 또 대만에 대한 무기 판매를 증대시켰습니다. 부시 대통령은 중국의 부총리를 맞이하는 대신에 일본의 고이즈미 전 총리를 맞이했었습니다. 중국과 미국 간의 관계가 조금 위태롭지 않은가 라고도 점치는 사람이 있었습니다. 그러나

6년이 지난 지금 다시 살펴보면 서로 반목하는 것이 아니라 중국과 미국은 지금 협력 관계를 구축을 하고 있고 다양한 이슈를 함께 논의를 하고 있습니다.

쌍무적인 관계에 있어서 양국은 협력적인 관계를 다양한 이슈, 환경, 이민 문제, 국경문제, 지적재산권 문제, 그리고 테러에 대한 전쟁에 대해서 함께 목소리를 내고 있습니다. 협력을 더욱 더 공고하게 해서 대만의 분리주의에도 함께 대처해 나가고 있습니다. 그리고 지역주의 차원에서 보자면 중국과 미국은 협력 관계를 바탕으로 이 지역에서 평화와 안정에 기여하고 있습니다. 중국 정부는 건설적인 미국의 주둔 그 자체에 대해서 환영을 했었고, 미국 정부는 중국이 지역협력에서 역할을 더욱 더 담당하도록 요구했습니다. ARF라든가 APEC에서 좀 더 활발한 역할을 담당해 주기를 요청을 하고 있습니다. 양국의 협력관계는 효율적으로 진행이 되어 한반도의 핵 위기를 봉쇄하는데 일조를 했었습니다. 글로벌 차원에서 보면 중국과 미국이 다양한 이슈 - 환경보호 그리고 또 국경을 넘나드는 문제라든가 그리고 또 이제 NPT와 같은 부분- 에 대해서도 함께 목소리를 내고 있습니다.

그런데 이제 많은 사람들은 새로운 냉전이 다시 등장하지 않는가라고 이야기를 하고 있습니다. 가장 최근에 푸틴 대통령이 “미사일을 유럽에 겨냥을 하겠다”고 언급한 바 있습니다. 부시 대통령이 미사일을 폴란드와 체코공화국에 설치하면 러시아는 유럽에 대해서 미사일을 쏘겠다고 언급을 했었습니다. 2000년대 초반부터 강대국 간의 관계가 계속해서 변해 오고 있습니다.

중국과 러시아의 관계는 좀 완만한 곡선을 보이고 있습니다. 푸틴 대통령이 미국에 대해서 계속해서 주목하고 있기 때문입니다. 시간이 지나면서 러시아와의 관계가 조금은 정제되어가고 있고, 푸틴 대통령은 더 많은 비중을 중국과의 관계에 두기 시작했고, 이런 노력의 결과 중국과 러시아의 관계가 과거 열친 대통령 당시보다 훨씬 더 많이 좋아진 것을 알 수 있습니다.

중국과 러시아의 관계에 비유해 볼 때 중국과 EU의 관계는 한 방향으로 크게 움직이고 있는 것 같지는 않았었습니다. 2000년대 초반부터 한 방향으로 나아가는 것이 아니라 상당히 덜컹거리는 그런 관계가 있었습니다. 왜냐

하면 미국이 코소보에 군사개입을 했기 때문이었습니다. 경제적인 관계가 중국과 EU 간에 활발하게 진행되면서 어느 정도 관계가 호전이 되었습니다. 그런데 몇몇 EU의 주요 가입국들은 미국의 일방주의적인 행동을 용인하는 것을 상당히 어려워했습니다. 이라크에 군사적인 개입을 했을 때에는 그것이 최고점에 도달을 했습니다. 중국과 EU 간의 관계가 개선된 것은 EU가 2005년도에 중국에 대해서 수출입 금지를 해지하면서 부터였습니다. 그 이후부터 관계가 많이 좋아졌었습니다.

이와 유사하게 미국과 EU의 관계에서도 많은 변화가 있었습니다. 과거에는 부시행정부가 모든 것을 거의 독단적, 일방적으로 하는 것이 많이 있었으나 이제는 그렇게 하다보니까 서로가 좀 불편하게 되었습니다. 국방장관이 새로운 유럽에 대해서 반대를 했었고 기존의 전통적인 미국과 유럽 간의 동맹관계가 조금 더 달라졌었습니다. 부시 대통령이 이라크에 대한 전쟁 선포를 하면서 또 새로운 관계가 나타나게 되었습니다.

이러한 강대국의 관계들이 왜 이렇게 달라지는가. 전문가들은 아마 외교 관계 때문에 그렇지 않은가라고 이야기를 하고 있습니다. 그것은 첫 번째로는 단극화라고 볼 수가 있겠습니다. 왜냐하면 국제체제가 단극화되는 것이 중요한 요인이라는 것입니다. 두 번째는 글로벌화가 되겠고 세 번째는 바로 강대국의 선택의 개념이 좀 달라졌기 때문이라고 보고 있습니다. 국제 시스템이 이제 단극화적인 성격을 지님에 따라서 강대국 관계에서 큰 구조적인 영향을 주고 있습니다. 사실 단극화 체제를 갖추고 있으면 축이 되는 국가와 부상국과의 관계에서 긴장과 갈등이 더욱 더 증대될 수가 있습니다.

이러한 단극화 체제하에서 주축이 되는 국가는 더욱 더 예민해 질 수 밖에 없고 또 이러한 갈등을 잠재우기 위해서 많은 노력을 해야 할 것입니다. 그 주축국가로서 미국 같은 경우는 지금 전세계 유일한 슈퍼 파워 역할을 맡고 있긴 하지만, 자신들이 갖고 있는 관심이나 이해관계는 다른 그 동맹국과 다른 참 독특한 것일 수도 있습니다. 그래서 아주 적극적인 행동을 해서 본인들이 가지고 있는 독특한 이해를 보호하려고 하는 것입니다. 이러한 것들은 주변국들과의 관계에 있어서 도움이 되지 않는 것입니다.

단극화적인 관계는 결국은 주축이 되는 국가와 부상하는 국가 간의 관계를 복잡하게 만들고 있습니다. 만일에 그 주축국들이 주변국이나 아니면 동맹국의 이해관계나 관심을 무시하는 경우에는 반발이 나타나게 될 수밖에 없습니다.

현재 미국이 그 유일한 강대국이고 다른 국가들은 할 수 없이 모든 것을 수용하는 상황이 많습니다. 그래서 이러한 상황에서 중국은 다른 나라들과 관계개선을 모색하고 있습니다. 러시아나 인도나 일본과의 관계가 쉽지는 않습니다만 그러한 길을 모색해 나가고 있습니다. 중국은 나름대로 압력과 긴장을 느끼면서 다른 국가 간의 관계를 개선시키기 위한 노력을 하고 있습니다. 만일에 국제체제의 단극화적인 그런 성격이 협력보다는 갈등을 더욱 더 야기할 경우에 국제 시스템에서 글로벌화는 강대국간의 협력을 더욱 더 요구하게 될 것입니다.

점점 더 많은 중국의 기업들이 미국의 주식시장에 상장을 하고 있고, 또 많은 미국의 그 연기금들이 중국에 주식시장에 투자가 되고 있는 상황입니다. 이런 상황을 고려해 볼 때 양국 간의 경제관계는 과거 어느 때보다 많이 결속이 되어있는 것이 사실입니다. 그 결과 양국은 서로의 관계에서, 국제 체제에 대해서 주목을 하고 있습니다. 미국의 밥 젤릭이 중국에 대해서 얘기를 했을 때 '상당히 중요한 이해 당사자'라는 표현을 했었습니다. 그리고 중국의 눈으로 봤을 때는 미국도 마찬가지로 중요한 이해당사자입니다. 이러한 이유 때문에 양국이 무력을 사용하거나 대치관계에 들어가는 것은 거의 불가능한 것으로 봅니다.

이러한 상황은 양국 간의 구조적인 갈등을 완화시키는 그런 효과를 가져다 줄 수도 있습니다. 글로벌화가 확산되고 또 깊이가 더해 갈수록 전 세계는 이제 국경을 초월한 여러 가지 도전에 직면 하고 있습니다. 예를 들어서 대량 살상 무기의 확산이나 테러리즘이나 환경이나 아니면 국경을 초월한 그런 범죄나 전염병 같은 문제가 되겠습니다. 이러한 문제들은 사실 한 국가만이 효과적으로 풀 수 있는 것이 아닙니다. 이런 것은 마찬가지로 미국에도 똑같이 적용될 수가 있습니다. 물론 미국은 자원도 풍부하고 힘도 막강하지만 독

자적으로는 생존할 수 없는 그런 환경에 처해 있습니다.

물론 부시 행정부는 최근 들어와 선별적인 다자주의라고까지 부르는 용어까지 채택하고 있습니다. 한국의 핵 위기가 발생을 했었을 때 미국은 6자회담에 의존해 그 해결을 모색했었습니다.

마지막으로 글로벌화가 진행이 되면서 더 많은 국가들이 시장원칙을 채택하고 있고, 그런 가치는 시장원칙과 함께 연결이 되어 법치, 자유, 투명성 그리고 공정 등의 가치들이 주목을 받게 되었습니다. 국제사회도 이제는 과거 어느 때보다 가치의 관점에서 모든 것을 살펴보고 있습니다. 이렇기 때문에 이제 강대국 간의 협력이 더욱 더 촉진되고 있는 것입니다.

앞으로는 어떠한 일이 벌어질까요? 미래를 내다보면 강대국의 관계는 계속해서 앞으로 단극적인 전 세계 시스템과 국제시스템의 글로벌화에 영향을 받게 될 것입니다. 세계적으로 나타나는 여러 가지 도전이 사람들에게 더 많은 위협을 주고, 사람들의 존재라든가 안녕에 영향을 주고 있기 때문에 미국은 다른 나라와 협력을 하지 않을 수 없을 것입니다. 물론 단기적으로 봤을 때 개별국가들은 이러한 영향을 무시하고, 바라는 바에 따라서 외교정책을 시행하려고 하겠지만 장기적으로 봤을 때는 그러한 영향을 받을 수밖에 없다는 것입니다. 어떤 일이 벌어지든지 간에 갈등과 협력은 계속해서 지속될 것이고, 이것은 결국은 국제시스템에 있어서 단극화 현상이 있기 때문이며 글로벌화가 있기 때문입니다. 그리고 또 각국이 나름대로 그 선택하는 방식에 따라서 이러한 것의 모양이 드러날 것입니다.

Seven years has passed since the world entered the 21st century. Much has changed in great power politics. Contrary to some people's expectations, great power relations have developed in unexpected directions. Instead of entering into a hegemonic rivalry, China and the US have developed closer and more cooperative relations; instead of seeing their relations deteriorate through the floor, China and Japan have managed to improve it; instead of finding each other in each other's arms, Russia and US are seeing their relationship nose-diving into something bordering cold confrontation; instead of prolonging a promising honey moon, US and Japan have to make efforts to stay close; and instead of deepening their strategic partnership on the basis of shared values, US and EU are struggling to maintain a united front on a whole range of issues. Great power relations in the new century are full of surprises. What is going on? How do we explain with all these developments? What do they bode for the future? These are the questions this paper will seek to explore.

I. Surprises

Perhaps the most significant surprise in great power relations since the beginning of the new century is the positive and stable development of China US relations. When the century began, just as some realists predicted¹⁾, China US relations appeared to

1) Lichade Boensitan & Luosi Mangluo, *Jijiang daolai de meizhong chongtu*

be heading toward confrontation. Upon entering the White House, President Bush honored his campaign promises by assuming a tougher position on China than that of his predecessors. He “telephoned every major world leader but Chinese President Jiang Zemin.” His administration reportedly planned to “target more U.S. missiles against China.” It gave serious consideration to “prioritizing preparation for conventional war in East Asia against China and has promoted enhanced strategic cooperation with India and Japan.” It “encouraged Japan to loosen its restraints on a more active regional military presence” and “proposed development with U.S. allies South Korea, Japan and Australia of a ‘regional’ dialogue.” It “stressed cooperation with Russia on missile defense seemingly at the expense of China.” It decided to bar Chinese-made products and essentially stopped all contact between the Pentagon and the Chinese military, and it “reversed a twenty-year U.S. policy by agreeing to sell submarines to Taiwan” and “allowed high-profile visits to the United States by Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian and the Dalai Lama.” On top of all this, the administration did not appoint “a specialist on China to any senior position in the government.”²⁾

The EP-3 incident in April 2001 highlighted the degree of mistrust and tension between Washington and Beijing. In the

(Richard Bernstein & Ross Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China*) (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1997), pp.169-183.

2) Robert S. Ross, “The Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait”, *The National Interest* (Fall: 2001), pp.67-68.

wake of the incident, both sides raised its voices and blamed the other side for the collision. Popular emotions in both countries ran high. To many in Washington, China's objection to U.S. spy missions along the Chinese coast constituted an early indication of China's international strategic orientation: as it grows in power, it is going to expand its security perimeter and deny American access to an ever larger area in the Asia-Pacific region.³⁾ To many in Beijing, the incident showed that the U.S. harbored ill intentions towards China and demonstrated how unreasonable Washington could be when something gets in its way.⁴⁾ Efforts were made on the part of both countries to stabilize the relationship during China's period of reform and opening up. At times, these efforts even brought some euphoria of cooperation.⁵⁾ However, despite these and other attempts, the

3) Jake Tapper, "Critics: Bush caved to China", April 13, 2001, [www. Salon.com](http://www.Salon.com).

4) "Jiujing shuizai weifa: cong guojifa jiaodu toudi zhongmei zhuangji shijian" (Who violated international law: examining the Sino-American plane-crash incident from the perspective of international law), April 15, 2001, _www.sina.com.cn; "Zhongguo qunqing fenkai: Jiang Zemin cumei tingzhi diandao shifei(Widespread anger in China: Jiang Zemin asked the U.S. Government to stop confusing right and wrong)", April 5, 2001, www.zaobao.com.

5) For example, in the aftermath of the EP-3 incident, both sides tried to contain the damage to the relationship. President Bush sent Secretary of State Colin Powell to Beijing in July 2001. During the visit, both sides agreed that it was important to avoid similar conflicts in the future and pledged to improve relations between the two countries. Also during the visit, the administration dropped the term "strategic competitor" as a description of China. "Interview of Secretary of State Colin Powell By CCTV" Beijing, China, July 28, 2001, Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America,

bilateral relationship was largely out of balance before the 9.11. By the time of the terrorist attacks against the World Trade Towers, the Pentagon had not invited the Chinese military attache for a visit in eight months. It did not even feel it appropriate to allow the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINPAC) to receive a group of Chinese college teachers in Hawaii in July 2001.⁶⁾ And it was busy drafting the new *Quadrennial Defense Review*, which treats China as a potential threat and outlines measures that the U.S. should adopt to cope with it.⁷⁾

Six years later, one finds that instead of being at each other's throats, they are engaged in cooperation on a whole range of issues. At the bilateral level, the two countries saw cooperation on an increasing range of issues such as environment, immigration, cross-border crime, rule of law, intellectual property rights, war against terror as well as economic relations,

Backgrounder, 01-19a, August 2, 2001, pp.2-3.

6) My personal experience. I was the Chinese coordinator of the Peking University/East West Center program on teaching about China and the United States.

7) A sanitized version of the report was eventually issued after the September 11. It is said that post-September 11 revisions removed China from several places in the document. However, one can still see how Pentagon was thinking about China before September 11 in the passages such as the following one: "Although the United States will not face a peer competitor in the near future, the potential exists for regional powers to develop sufficient capabilities to threaten stability in regions critical to U.S. interests." Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001, p.4.

educational and cultural exchanges. They even found it necessary to cooperate on the Taiwan issue as both are determined not to let Taiwan independence to drag the two countries into an unnecessary military confrontation.⁸⁾

At the regional level, the two countries are engaged in cooperation to maintain peace and stability in the region. The Chinese Government expressed its welcome to constructive US presence in the region.⁹⁾ The US Government has encouraged China to play a positive role in regional cooperation such as its participation in the ARF and APEC as well as other official and unofficial dialogue mechanisms. Among other things, the two countries cooperated effectively in containing the Korean nuclear crisis.

At the global level, the two countries are cooperating on an increasing number of issues including environmental protection, UN peacekeeping, humanitarian disaster relief, maritime safety, free trade, anti-smuggling, anti-cross border crimes, nonproliferation of mass destruction etc. As a result of this, despite numerous problems between the two countries, their relationship has become more comprehensive, more balanced and more cooperative than any time in history.

Another significant development in great power relations since the beginning of the century is the seemingly unstoppable

8) "Chinese, US presidents meet over bilateral ties, issues of common concern", http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-10/20/content_1131209.htm.

9) For example, Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong's speech at the Asia Society, September 22, 2005, <http://www.china-embassy.org/chn/zmgx/t213523.htm>.

deterioration of the relationship between Japan and China and its recent dramatic improvement. During the early years of the century, political relations between the two countries had moved from bad to worse until recently. The two countries were confronted with many problems including history textbooks, Yasukuni Shrine visit, sovereignty over the Diaoyu Island, North Korea refugee, oil and gas exploration rights in the East China Sea, oil pipelines in the Russia Far East, Japan's relationship with Taiwan and Japan's bid for the UN Security Council permanent membership. Opinion surveys conducted in recent years suggest that there is increasing distrust and hostility toward each other among peoples in both countries.¹⁰⁾

The trend of development of the relationship was deeply troubling when problems between the two countries over Diaoyu Island (Senkagu Island), disputes over rights in East China Sea, and Taiwan threatened to bring about a military confrontation between the two countries. On the Diaoyu Island, nationalists of both countries have tried to get on the island and

10) For example, according to an opinion survey conducted respectively in China and Japan in 2006, both Chinese and Japanese views of Japan and China are very negative. Among the Chinese respondents, 56.1% of Chinese and 46.8% of Chinese students have very negative or negative view of Japan as opposed to 14.5% and 7.8% with a very positive or positive view of Japan. Among the Japanese respondents, 36.4% of Japanese and 40.3% of Japanese with degrees of schools of higher learning have very negative or negative views of China and 11.8% and 26.3% with a very positive or positive view of China. The survey was conducted by Opinion NPO and Peking University respectively in Japan and China in 2006.

hoist national flags there as a symbolic way to claim it.¹¹⁾ On several occasions, Chinese nationalists tried to do so and confronted with Japanese patrol ships in the neighboring areas.¹²⁾ On the East China Sea, claims of China and Japan overlap and at times military tensions rose as war ships were dispatched to the area.¹³⁾ On Taiwan, the US-Japan defense guidelines call for joint actions in the crisis of the so-called “neighboring areas”. Despite repeated demands on the part of China on Japan to clarify what it means and that it should exclude Taiwan, the Japanese Government has dodged the demand. Clearly, if a war breaks out in the Taiwan Strait, the Japanese Government may invoke the Guidelines for Japanese participation in the war on the US side. Looking at relations between the two countries in 2006, many in the world were deeply concerned.

Yet, all of a sudden, relations between the two countries reversed course with Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China in October 8, 2006 following an eleven months suspension of summit meetings between the two countries because of his

11) <http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2004-04-09/08112262446s.shtml>.

12) <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-10-14/1906918758s.shtml>.

13) “China deploys ships to areas Japan claims: tensions rise as fleet of warships appears near disputed as fieldd just days before election and a few weeks before drilling is to begin”, *San Francisco Chronic*, September 11, 2005, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/09/11/MNGDGELU7M1;DTL>; Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions, *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2007, pp.129-133.

predecessor's insistence on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine despite China's strong protest. The visit, known as an ice-breaking effort, was followed by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Japan in March 2007, known as an ice-melting effort. Through the two visits, the two countries vowed to restore and improve the relationship. Despite various problems the two countries still face in managing the relationship, there is good reason to expect the relationship to move on the right track.

A similarly dramatic development in great power relations since beginning of the century is the recent sharp deterioration of relations between the US and Russia. It is dramatic because when President Bush came to office in 2001, relations between the US and Russia appeared very promising. Following his meeting with Putin, Bush said that "looked the man in the eye", "found him to be very straight forward and trustworthy", and "was able to get a sense of his soul."¹⁴⁾

However, good time did not last long. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated so much since then that some people are now talking about a new cold war. Among other things, in his most recent threats, President Putin said that he would aim missiles at Europe if Bush were to go ahead with his plans to install antiballistic missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic.¹⁵⁾

14) Caroline Wyatt, "Bush and Putin: Best of friends", <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1392791.stm>.

15) Jay Tolson, "Peering Into His Soul May Not Be Enough", <http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/070610/18week.htm>.

Less dramatic changes in great power relations since the beginning of the century are those between China and Russia, China and EU, the US and EU and the US and Japan. China and Russia relations had a moderate start as President Putin focused his attention to the US just as his predecessor Boris Yeltzin when he came into office. However, over time, as Russia's relationship cooled down, Putin began to attach greater importance to Russia's relationship with China. In part also as a result of efforts on both sides to promote the relationship, China and Russia saw improvement of their relationship far exceeding the level scored by Yeltzin. Now they have not only resolved the remaining border problems, but also made headways to enhance the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. While both insist that they are not interested in forging an alliance relationship, they have introduced much substance into their strategic partnership including conducting increasingly large-scale military exercises.

Comparing to Sino-Russian relationship, China-EU relationship has not moved in one direction since the beginning of the new century. It began with rocky start following the EU and the US military intervention in Kosovo despite the opposition of Russia and China. The relationship improved as economic relations between China and EU grew rapidly and as major members of the EU found it hard to accept the alleged US unilateralism especially US military intervention in Iraq. The improvement of the relationship between China and EU reached a peak when EU seriously considered lifting arms embargo against China in 2005.¹⁶⁾ Since then, however, relations between the two have

drifted apart as trade deficit, human rights and Tibet questions became more pronounced.

Similarly, relations between US and EU experienced some ups and downs. Increasing unilateralist tendency on the part of the Bush Administration made its European allies increasingly uneasy. Former Defense Secretary's talk about new Europe as opposed to old Europe further alienated the more traditional American European allies. Bush Administration's decision to launch war against Iraq despite the opposition on the part of Germany and France sent the relationship to a new low. Although the relationship between the two sides has improved somewhat as a result of efforts on both sides, it is no longer the same. Europeans remain as wary of US unilateralist inclination as ever on questions ranging from Iran to environment.

When the new century began, US and Japan appeared to be of great promise. Highly critical of Clinton Administration's neglect of Japan (Japan passing?), the Bush Administration vowed to strengthen the alliance relationship, to which Japan, for its own reasons, eagerly responded. The relationship reached a high point when Japan pledged troops to join the US war against Iraq despite domestic opposition. Once again personal relationship mattered. The somewhat ironic close relationship between a conservative Bush and a liberal Koizumi helped to sustain the good relationship between the two

16) "EU arms embargo against China", <http://www.taiwandc.org/arms-embargo.htm>.

countries. Both sides were so determined to shore up the relationship that they found it necessary to play down problems between them. On the US side, the Bush Administration made it sure that such issues as beef and history would not get in the way. On the Japanese side, the Koizumi Government was determined not to allow issues such as the Kyoto Protocol, Iraq War, and North Korea abduction issue derail the relationship. With the departure of Koizumi, however, the relationship appears to be cooling down. Among other things, the US has found Japanese handling of the history issue less and less acceptable while Japan feels increasing urgency to get its troops out of the Iraqi quagmire.

II. Unipolarity, Globalization and Choice

All this appears to be somewhat different from people's expectations at the beginning of this century. Why have relations among the great powers developed this way? Analysis suggests that the following three factors may help explain such development: (1) uniplarity; (2) globalization; and (3) perceptions and choices on the part of great powers.

1. Unipolarity

The unipolar nature of the international system has structural impact on great power relations. To begin with, among

international systems, the unipolar system is most likely to generate tension and conflicts between the “pole” state and the rising state. This is because, under the unipolar system, the “pole” state is most sensitive about, has least need to be tolerant of and most capable of containing, the rising state.

The “pole” state is most sensitive to the rising state under a unipolar system because it is the only “pole” state in the system. Since there is no other “pole” state to worry about, it can easily place its attention to the rising state. In addition, because there is no other “pole” state in existence, the “pole” state can easily conclude that rising state is an independent development and more often than not as a challenge or threat to itself. The “pole” state has least need to accept the rising state under a unipolar system because there is no other “pole” state in the system. It does not have to worry that its opposition to the rising non-“pole” states may push it to other “pole” states. It does not need to be concerned with joint or unilateral intervention on the part of other “pole” states to help the rising state in case of its opposition to the rising state. And it does not need to worry that its opposition to rising state may unnecessarily consume its resources and thereby undermine its ability to compete with its real rival, that is, other “pole” states. Therefore, it has least reason to tolerate the rising state. The “pole” is most tempted to take measures against the rising state under a unipolar system because it does need to worry about possible intervention from other “pole” states. This helps explain the difficulties China and the US encountered during the early period of the Bush

Administration and also the underlying nervousness and tension on the part both sides in managing their relationship.

In the second place, the unipolar nature of the international system complicates relations between the US and its allies. As the “pole” state, the US finds itself not only the only superpower but also some of its interests are “unique”, that is, different from those of its allies. This explains why in pursuing its interests the Bush Administration often feels difficult to persuade its allies to follow and the necessity to do it alone or unilaterally even this may create tension in its relations with its allies. Take the US decision to attack Iraq for example. The US could not persuade some of its key allies and had to go ahead with the attack without their support. As the only superpower, the US is the main target of terrorist attacks. Therefore, it felt much more strongly than its allies to take strong actions, war if necessary, to ward off such threats, even if such threats are not quite established in the eyes of its allies.

Finally, it complicates relations between the “pole” state and rising state on the one hand and other major powers on the other. If the “pole” state can ignore its allies’ interests, it can certainly be insensitive to the interests of those major powers who are not allies. After all, the US is very powerful and the party whose interests get compromised has to swallow it. This helps to explain the deterioration of US-Russia relations. The Russians had protested many times against the NATO expansion and the deployment of missile defense systems in Europe. They pointed out that this would undermine Russian security and in turn

European security when Russia feels compelled to adopt countermeasures. However, the US has completely ignored Russian concerns and this has led to current problems between the US and Russia.

2. Globalization

If the unipolar nature of the international system generates more conflicts than cooperation, the globalizing nature of the international system creates more need for cooperation among major powers. To begin with, as states' economies are increasingly integrated with one another, there is growing stakes in avoid military conflicts. This is the case with Sino-American relations. Trade and economic relations between the two countries have developed drastically both in breath and in depth over the years. According to US Commerce Department, China-US trade in 2006 amounted to US\$343 billion, representing 20.2% growth over the year 2005.¹⁷⁾

Because of the difference in methods of compiling statistics, Chinese figures are quite different. According to Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the trade volume between the two countries in 2006 stood at US\$262.68 billion, representing 24.2% growth over the previous year.¹⁸⁾ By any standards, however, the trade volume between the two countries is very significant. Now

17) <http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html>

18) <http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200702/20070204346971.html>.

Table 1: China's Trade with the United States (\$ billion)

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
US Exports	11.8	12.0	12.8	14.3	13.1	16.3	19.2	22.1	28.4	34.7	41.8	55.2
% change	26.9	1.7	6.7	10.9	-8.0	24.4	18.3	15.1	28.5	22.2	20.6	32.0
US Imports	45.6	51.5	62.6	71.2	81.8	100.0	102.3	125.2	152.4	196.7	243.5	287.8
% change	17.5	13.0	21.5	13.8	14.9	22.3	2.2	22.4	21.7	29.1	23.8	18.2
Total	57.4	63.5	75.4	85.5	94.9	116.3	121.5	147.3	180.8	231.4	285.3	343.0
% change	19.3	10.6	18.7	13.4	11.0	22.6	21.4	21.2	22.8	28.0	23.3	20.2
US Balance	-33.8	-39.5	-49.8	-56.9	-68.7	-83.7	-83.0	-103.1	-124.0	-162.0	-201.6	-232.5

Note: US exports reported on FOB basis; imports on a general customs value, CIF basis Sources: US International Trade Commission, US Department of Commerce, and US Census Bureau

the US is China's second largest trading partner and China the US's third largest trading partner.

In terms of investment, by the end of July 2007, US companies had invested in China close to 53,754 projects with an actualized value of US\$ 55.42 billion. And by the end of June 2007, Chinese companies had invested close to US\$ 3 billion in the US.¹⁹⁾ According to the US Department of Treasury, China was holding US\$256.7 billion US Government treasury bonds by the end of 2005.²⁰⁾ In the mean time, more and more Chinese companies are listed in the US stock markets and increasing number of US retirement funds are investing in China's stock

19) <http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/71364/6316169.html>.

20) http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-02/17/content_4191335.htm.

markets.²¹⁾

Against this background, economies of the two countries are more closely tied up with each other than any time in history. As a result, both countries have huge stakes in their relationship and in the international system. It is because of this development that former Under Secretary of State, Robert Zoelick, talked about China as an important stakeholder and asked the Chinese Government to act responsibly in international affairs. And the Chinese Government in turn views the US as an important stakeholder and expects the latter to do the same. In part because of this, it is quite inconceivable that the two countries wish to have confrontation and use force to address their problems. Such a situation certainly has a moderating effect on the structural tension between the US and China generated by the unipolar system.

In addition, as globalization spreads and deepens, the world is confronted with increasing cross-national challenges: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, environment, transnational crimes, infectious diseases, etc. None of these challenges can be dealt with effectively by one country alone. This also applies to the US. There is growing need for cooperation. Accordingly, the US has been seeking help from all over the world to deal with these problems and found it impossible to abandon multilateral cooperation completely in conducting international relations. Even the Bush Administration

21) Lawrence Carrel, "These China Mutual Funds Keep Soaring", October 1, 2007, <http://www.thestreet.com/funds/mutualfundmonday/10382025.html>.

found it necessary to adopt what Richard Haas call “a la carte” multilateralism.²²⁾ This is the case with the war against terror when the US found it necessary to form a “coalition of the willing”. This is also the case with the Korean nuclear crisis when the US found it necessary to turn to the six party talks.

Finally, as globalization proceeds, more and more countries adopt the market principles and increasingly those values associated with the market principles such as rule of law, freedom, transparency and fairness. Increasingly, the international community has more things in common in terms of values than ever before. This again facilitates cooperation between the great powers.

3. Perception and choices on the part of the major players

If the broad trends give great powers both incentive and disincentives to cooperate with each other, the individual power itself also has a role to play in terms of managing their relations, although within certain limits. The US opted for the Bush doctrine which among other things leans toward unilateralism and has caused many problems in US relations with European allies. The US option to ignore Russia’s perceived interests helps explain the current tension between the two countries. China’s

22) Richard Butler, “Sovereignty Uber Alles”, The Globalist, April 24, 2002, <http://www.theglobalist.com/DBWeb/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2438>.

option for a policy of reassurance has lessened anxiety and fear of the outside world about the rise of China and that to some extent explains the rather positive relations with the US despite the structural incentives for them to confront each other.

III. Prospect of development

Looking ahead, one finds that great power relations will continue to be influenced by the unipolar and globalizing nature of the international system. On the one hand, the unipolar nature of the international system will continue to generate tensions between the US (the “pole” state) and China (the rising state). This is especially the case when China continues with its current level of growth. Given the uniqueness of its interests, the US is likely to find it difficult to manage its relations with its allies, even though it will certainly try very hard to do so. And it is likely to find it difficult to manage its relations with non-ally powers especially Russia for similar reasons. Similarly, both the US allies and other powers will also find it difficult to manage their relations with the US.

On the other hand, the globalizing imperatives of the international system will continue to offer incentives for cooperation and thereby limit and moderate potential conflicts between the major powers. China and the US will find greater reasons for cooperation despite the realist impulse to engage in confrontation. With the global challenges pose even more

immediate and fundamental threats to wellbeing and even existence of the international community, the US will find it necessary to work with other countries despite the fact that some of its interests are unique. Other great powers will also find the need to work together to cope with the increasing global challenges

Under the circumstances, the great powers themselves do not have much room to decide how they should pursue their interests. In the short run, individual powers may ignore such influence and conduct foreign policy according to their wishes. However, in the long run, their behavior is likely to be conditioned by such influences.

If the previous analysis is correct, one would expect the current broad trend of development of relations among great powers to continue. In the mean time, one is also likely to see some adjustments. For example, the US probably will temper its unilateralist tendency and work more closely with other powers. This is especially the case with the change of government next year. Russia and the US are likely to find some way to accommodate each other. Conflict and cooperation will continue to characterize great power relations in the 21st century.